Financial Sources of small-scale manufacturers: A micro-analysis for Malaysia by Bruch, Mathias
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Bruch, Mathias
Working Paper
Financial Sources of small-scale
manufacturers: A micro-analysis for
Malaysia
Kiel Working Papers, No. 157
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Bruch, Mathias (1982) : Financial Sources of small-scale manufacturers: A
micro-analysis for Malaysia, Kiel Working Papers, No. 157, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52668Kieler Arbeitspapiere
Kiel Working Papers
Working Paper No. 157
Financial Sources of Small-Scale
Manufacturers:
A Micro-Analysis for Malaysia
by I
Mathias [Bruch
Institut fiir Weltwiitschaft an der Universitat KielFinancial Sources of Small-Scale Manufacturers: A Micro-
Analysis for Malaysia*
Increasing concern about insufficient earnings opportunities
for a large share of the labor force in many developing
countries and about the long-run viability of industrial
growth has made the development of small-scale manufacturing
establishments (SSEs) a much debated issue in the recent
past. Imperfections in capital markets have been identified
as important factors impeding the establishment of new
SSEs as well as the expansion and modernization of existing
ones . While the impact of interest rate regulation and
quantitative interventions in credit markets on the access
of SSEs to formal credit has found due attention in the
2
literature , problems of bridging the gap between formal
financial institutions and the informal and unsophisticated
nature of many, if not most SSEs have been relatively neglec-
ted . In this paper an attempt is made to shed more light
on the latter aspect of credit markets in developing coun-
tries .
In a situation where barriers for SSEs to gain access to
formal credit are high, entrepreneurs are largely confined
to own funds and informal sources of credit, such as family
members, friends, moneylenders, and suppliers of materials.
In financing SSE activities, it has been argued, informal- 2 -
credit markets have some distinct advantages over formal
markets, such as a higher degree of flexibility and lower
transaction costs due to a more intimate knowledge of
4
local conditions . On the other hand, it should be noted
that informal credit markets are subject to some marked
disadvantages, both from the point of view of the individual
entrepreneur as well as concerning social efficiency. Infor-
mal loans are usually confined to small amounts and to short
repayment periods. The efficient allocation of funds tends
to be impeded by the local nature of informal credit markets;
and their capacity for mobilizing savings, refinancing, and
term transformation is rather limited in general., Informal
sources are likely to be adequate for financing traditional
activities, where investment in fixed assets can be made in
small steps and gestation periods are short. Access to in-
stitutional credit can, however, be regarded as essential
for financing the establishment of nontraditional enter-
prises and for the modernization and expansion of already
existing ones. Such access cannot only be impeded by credit
policies, but also by several other factors to be discussed
in this paper. Despite the (potential) contribution of non-
traditional SSEs, in particular, to the generation of produc-
tive jobs and to a balanced industrial structure, little is
known about the relative importance of different sources of
finance in SSEs, and about the determinants of lending de-
cisions in financial institutions and borrowing decisions
in SSEs. A better understanding of such decisions on the
micro-level may not. only provide more insight into the- 3
conditions of SSE development, but may also prove to be
helpful in the design of policy measures to facilitate
efficient financial development.
The empirical analysis is based on the situation in
Malaysia in 19 73, which for two reasons is of particular
interest for the subject matter of this paper. First/ policy
interventions in credit markets were fairly moderate and
did not discriminate against SSEs directly, since there was
not regulated maximum interest rate in lending operations .
In many countries such a regulation has effectively confined
access to formal credit to fairly large borrowers. And,
secondly, financial assistance to SSEs was still in its in-
fancy .Thus,, financial sources of SSEs can be analyzed for
a situation where direct policy influences are insignificant.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows:
The relative importance of different financial sources of
SSEs for investment and working capital purposes is examined
in Section 1_._ Section 2 focuses on the theoretical discussion
of transaction costs and other factors influencing financial
sources of SSEs. In Section 3 discriminant analysis is
applied to identify factors which account for institutional
lending to take place. Concluding remarks are contained in
Section 4.- 4 -
1. Financial Sources and Plant Size
The following analysis of financial sources can take
advantage of the results of a microsurvey covering 399
West-Malaysian manufacturing establishments . This survey
was conducted in 19 74 and refers to 19 73. The sample has
been designed to study characteristics of the small-scale
manufacturing sector in West-Malaysia and includes industries
which actually as well as potentially are important for the
8
development of SSEs . Respondents were asked how they finan-
ced fixed assets purchased during the three years preceding
interviews as well as how they financed working capital
during the year of reference.
Answers are sought to the following questions:
( i) How does the relative importance of own funds and
credit vary with plant size ?
( ii) What are the most important sources of credit for
SSEs as opposed to larger establishments ?
(iii) When the formal share in total credit is found to
increase with plant size, does this result from
variations in the relative number of establishments
having received formal credit or from variations in
the relative amount of formal credit in establish-
ments which have received such credit ?- 5 -
The answer to the third question is essential for the
subsequent Sections. Aspects of credit rationing and small-
scale specific demand factors become relevant when it is
found that there are relatively few SSEs among the recipients
of formal credit.
(a) Fixed Assets
Confining the analysis to 171 establishments with pur-
chases of fixed assets during 1971-1973, it is shown in
Table 1 that the share of own funds is about two thirds
in all size groups; the remaining gap is financed by loans
and to a minor extent by equity participation. A closer
look reveals, however, that this is the case on an average
only, as just about half of the 171 establishments have re-
ceived any loans. A disaggregation of credit by source
clearly reflects financing conditions being different between
establishments of different size. While relatives and friends
account for about 30-40 percent of total credit in estab-
lishments with less than 20 persons engaged, these sources
are virtually irrelevant in establishments with 50 or more
workers. For the latter the most important source of external
finance are commercial banks (line 12 in Table 1). "Other"
sources, which have been grouped among "formal" financial
institutions, are somewhat heterogeneous and consist of
formal institutions such as finance companies as well as
of informal sources such as moneylenders. A more appropriate- 6 -
Table 1 Financing of Fixed Capital Investment by Source and Plant Size
No. of establishitents (1)
No. of establishments with fixed
capital investment during 1971—
1973 (2)







Share in (2) (percent) (7)







Establishitents with bank credit:
Number (14)
Share in (2) (percent) (15)
Share in (6) (percent) (16)
Share of bank credit
in total credit (percent) (17)
in total investment funds
(percent) (18)
Establishments with "formal" credit:
Number (19)
Share in (2) (percent) (20)
Share in (6) (percent) (21)
Share of "formal" credit
in total credit (percent) (22)
























































































































































































Source: Sample survey (see text).- 7 -
classification (which is impeded by the data) would most
likely bring out the positive relation between plant size
and the share of formal finance even more clearly. The
question now arises, whether the share in total credit or
in total investment funds banks or "formal" institutions are
prepared to finance in individual establishments (lines (17),
(18), (22), and (23) in Table 1) is increasing with plant
size. The answer is that such a relationship cannot be
found in Table 1. On the other hand, it is clearly revealed
that, in contrast to larger establishments, relatively less
SSEs either have access to loans from banks and "formal"
institutions or are seeking such access (lines (15), (16),
(20), and (21) in Table 1). Hence, for the individual SSE
formal credit is not so much a matter of "how much", but
rather a matter of "whether at all".
(b) Working Capital
In most cases own funds are not sufficient to finance
working capital. Suppliers' credit is the most important
source of external working capital in establishments with
less than 100 employed persons (Table 2). In larger estab-
lishments over 50 percent come from commercial banks, mostly
in the form of overdrafts. This convenient and highly flexible
facility is rarely available to small establishments. Accor-
dingly, the share of relatives and friends as sources of ex-
ternal working capital is clearly decreasing with plant size,
while the share coming from commercial banks is increasingTable 2 : External Financing of Working Capital by Source and Plant Size
No. of establishments with external
sources of working capital (1)
Share in total no. of establish-
ments (percent) (2)
Sources of external finance (percent)




Establishments with bank credit
Number (7)
Share in (1) (percent) (8)
Share of bank credit in total ex-
ternally financed working capital (9)
Establishments with "formal" credit
Number (10)
Share in (1) (percent) (11)
Share of credit from banks and
other sources in total externally






































































































Source: Same as Table 1.- 10 -
rationing according to plant size as well as for reluctance
of SSEs to borrow from formal institutions will now be dis-
cussed. Often demand for formal credit by SSEs is taken
for granted and the discussion is confined to the lending
decision of financial institutions (or banks in short). In
this paper also factors influencing the borrowing decision
of SSEs are taken into account. Subsequently, credit supply
is dealt with first, followed by considerations relevant for
credit demand.
(a) Credit Rationing
Credit markets differ from commodity markets in various
ways. First, transactions in credit markets involve a rela-
tionship over a period of time between a lender and a borrower.
Hence, uncertainty resulting from imperfect foresight is an
essential element of credit markets. Secondly, information
is imperfect and asymetric. Banks find it difficult to identi-
fy "good borrowers" who are both willing and likely to be able
to repay the loan. I.e., the conditions of transactions are
not equally known to both sides of the market. And thirdly,
the terms of lending may affect the nature of transactions
by sorting borrowers (selection effect) and by influencing
their actions (incentive effect) . The implications of such
conditions for the functioning of credit markets have recently
become the focus of an extensive literature which is helpful
for explaining, first, how credit rationing can occur even
under competitive conditions and, secondly, why smaller estab-- 11 -
lishments may be more subject to such rationing than
larger establishments.
For a given cost of funds banks' expected rate of return
in lending operations is an increasing function of the
interest rate and a decreasing function of the default
risk. Theories of credit rationing in equilibrium are based
on the argument that the probability of repayment itself is
a decreasing function of the interest rate. Hence, there
may be an optimal interest rate for the banks beyond which
additional loans are not made available even when there is
excess demand. The underlying mechanisms have recently been
discussed by Stiglitz and Weiss and are briefly presented
below
When loan applicants are observationally identical, there
is only one such optimal interest rate. The default risk is
influenced by the interest rate via the selection effect and
the incentive effect. First, assume that applicants have only
one project each and that all projects have the same mean
1 2 return, but differ in riskiness . As is the case with all
fixed payment debts, the default risk is shared between
borrower and lender but not eventual gains in excess of prin-
cipal and interest . Therefore, only individuals with high-
risk projects apply for loans when the interest rate is
relatively high. Such an adverse selection effect may out-
weigh the direct effect of increasing interest rates on the
expected return on the loan portfolio to a bank. An analogous- 12 -
argument applies when each applicant has a choice of pro-
jects. In this case the attractiveness of riskier projects
to the borrower rises with increasing interest rates. Hence,
the bank has to take into account the adverse incentive
effect of increasing interest rates on the choice of pro-
jects by borrowers. Increasing collateral requirements
do not necessarily offset the adverse effect of increasing
interest rates on the risk structure of banks' loan portfolio.
Concerning collateral, an adverse selection effect may result
from wealthier individuals being less risk adverse than less
wealthy ones and an adverse incentive effect from smaller
loans being used to finance a given project, thus making
projects more likely to fail because of insufficient initial
funding.
In the real world, terms of lending are not the only
screening devices which are available to banks. When loan
applicants are observationally distinguishable, credit may
be rationed according to characteristics of potential
borrowers. Transaction costs are a useful concept for demon-
strating this. Transaction costs consist of adiministrative
costs and the default risk and are equal to the mark-up on
costs of funds needed by banks to break even in lending
operations. There may be a trade-off between the two compo-
nents of transaction costs as screening of loan applications
serves the purpose of filtering out exceedingly risky pro-
jects. Transaction costs can differ between groups of
borrowers for one or more of the following reasons:Blbllotfeek den Instittila
fflr Weltwirtschait Kiel
- 13 -
First, for a given level of "screening technology" it may
be more difficult and costly to identify project risks among
one group of borrowers than among another. Secondly, there
may be differences in the average riskiness of projects
between groups of borrowers. And thirdly, one type of
borrower may be less easy to supervise with respect to pro-
jects actually undertaken than another. Focusing on small-
scale (S) versus large-scale (L) borrowers, it has been
argued that when banks have little experience with lending
1 4 to SSEs transaction costs are exceedingly high . Since in
equilibrium the banks' expected rates of return on all loan
contracts must be equal, interest rates for S loans would
have to exceed interest rates for L loans by a large percent-
age which is equal to the difference in transaction costs.
In such a situation the default risk is, however, likely to
outweigh the direct effect of high interest rates on the
banks' rate of return. Therefore, loans to S applicants may
not be disbursed at all. Better screening techniques, as they
are likely to be developed under competitive conditions, may,
however, help some S applicants to obtain formal credit
and reduce the importance of establishment size as a screening
device.
Before the nature of such screening devices can be
examined empirically in the next section, more light has
to be shed upon the question why transaction costs are
strongly decreasing with the size of establishments when
there is a lack of familiarity of banks with SSEs as well- 14 -
as of SSEs with banks. In such a situation it is especially
difficult and costly to identify the riskiness of projects
among SSEs when documentation is deficient. Ho, for example,
reports that less than one third of establishments with
20-49 workers in Korea, practice double-entry bookkeeping and
less than one half have any recognisable form of bookkeeping
at all . A similar situation has also been found to persist
in the Philippines . Loan applications by large-scale estab-
lishments, on the other hand, are often evaluated on the
basis of audited statements. Often banks are also reluctant
to lend to SSEs, since they have little knowledge of the
conditions under which such projects succeed. Objective differ-
ences in the average riskiness of projects between S and L
borrowers may result from a number of factors.
First, management and entrepreneurship may be of a lower
quality in SSEs compared to larger establishments. This factor
is revealed as the most important determinant of economic
performance in a number of micro studies. In a study of the
wood and furniture industries in Ghana, Page attempted to
identify variables which might explain why costs of some
firms are significantly higher than of others. He concludes
that "variations in managerial effort and ability are signi-
ficant factors in explaining a firm's position relative to
the industry production frontier" . A recent study on SSEs
in Colombia by Cortes and Ishaq supports this conclusion and
provides more detail with respect to the type of entrepre-- 15 -
preneur who is successful. Cortes and Ishaq found that
"previous experience of the entrepreneur is an important
1 8 determinant of the firm's performance" . Another, though
scarcely used approach is the analysis of the causes leading
to a firm's failure. Failure rates are particularly high
for newly established small buisnesses. Itao found for the
Philippines that "the primary cause of failure among small
firms can be collectively attributed to management weeknesses
More specifically, these include lack of accounting records
1 9 and non-hiring of a certified public accountant/bookkeeper"
External factors which may account for a higher average
default risk being connected with loans to SSEs are their
discrimination by the protective system and by investment
promotion measures . In many countries such policies are
effectively excluding SSEs from profitable investment oppor-
tunities. And finally, deficiencies in the legal system may
restrain action to be taken against delinquent small-scale
borrowers.
(b) The Borrowing Decision in SSEs
When respondents were asked why purchases of fixed
assets were not financed by institutional sources, the
reasons generally provided were: lack of collateral, informal
loans are faster and more convenient, and interest rates
21 charged by relatives and friends are lower . These answers
suggest that besides credit rationing the essence of
borrowing decisions in SSEs lies in transaction costs- 16 -
incurred by the borrower as well as in the type of project
to be financed. For many SSEs applying for formal credit is
not a matter of mere routine, but an innovative act. Proper
documentation can take considerable time and effort when an
entrepreneur is not familiar with such procedures. Hence,
many SSEs prefer informal loans to finance small purchases
of fixed assets and normal requirements of working capital.
The volume of finance needed is important for the borrowing
decision for two reasons. First, at "reasonable" interest
rates informal sources are normally only able to provide
small amounts at short maturities. And secondly, transaction
costs incurred by the borrower tend to be more or less fixed,
thus implying a certain minimum volume of formal credit.
Relatively large amounts of finance are required for the
establishment of nontraditional SSEs as well as for upgrading
existing ones. Supposed the result obtained in Section 1 does
not reflect credit reationing, effective demand for formal
credit by SSEs may be restrained by internal reasons, such
as a lack of innovative entrepreneurs as well as by external
reasons implicit in economic policies and the institutional
^22 environment
3. Determinants of Financial Sources.: Discriminant Analysis
On the basis of available data an empirical test of
factors which may have had an influence on financial sources
of the sampled establishments must remain of a tentative- 17 -
nature. First, there is no information on interest rates,
on available collateral, and about the type of project which
has been financed. And secondly, external factors such as
effects of industrialization policies and the institutional
environment are beyond the reach of a country study based
on a single period of reference. Furthermore, some factors,
such as characteristics of the entrepreneur may be relevant
on both sides of the market.
Discriminant analysis has been applied to find that linear
combination of variables which allows best to statistically
distinguish between establishments with formal credit and
those without. Discriminating variables measure character-
istics on which the two groups are, expected to differ. Making
use of a stepwise procedure those variables with the highest
discriminating power can be selected. The objective of dis-
criminant analysis is to linearly combine discriminating
variables in such a way that the two groups are as statisti-
23 cally distinct as possible . The relative discriminatory
power of a discriminating variable can be derived from the
24
standardized discriminant function coefficient . The dis-
criminant procedure has been applied to three alternative
classifications of establishments. First, establishments
with bank credit are distinguished from establishments with-
out such credit. In the second alternative a difference is
made between establishments with "formal" credit and those
without. And thirdly, establishments with bank credit are- 18 -
compared with establishments without "formal" credit, i.e.,
establishments with credit from "other" sources but without
bank credit are neglected.
Besides plant size the following characteristics are in-
cluded as discriminating variables:
Establishment - age (since foundation)
legal status (individual ownership,
partnership = 1, otherwise = 0)
location (rural = 1, urban = 0)
25 capital-labor ratio
Entrepreneur - previous experience in related acti-
vity (yes = 1, no = 0)
professional qualification (technical,
commercial = 1, otherwise = 0)
formal education (secondary and more
= 1, otherwise = 0)
race (Malay = 1, otherwise = 0)
other business interests (yes = 1,
no = 0)
knowledge of available assistance to
SSEs (yes = 1, no = 0).
Arguments supporting the choice of these variables have
already been discussed above or are subsequently presented
in conjunction with the discriminant analysis results for
financial sources of working capital and investment finance.- 19 -
(a) Fixed Assets
The value of canonical correlation shows to what extent
the discriminant function is able to distinguish between the
groups of establishments. The value of canonical correlation
squared is the proportion of variance in the discriminant
function explained by the grouping procedure. Although this
proportion is relatively moderate (Table 3), group centroids
are significantly different at the 1 percent level for the
first and the third alternative. The results presented in
Table 3 reveal that plant size remains important as a deter-
minant of formal credit even after other characteristics
have been taken into account. Almost equally relevant is age;
older establishments have already proved their viability and
may for that reason be regarded by banks as less risky
borrowers. The results show, however, that the characteristics
of entrepreneurs are more decisive for formal lending than
establishment characteristics. Hence, small size as such
is not sufficient to exclude SSEs from access to formal
credit under competitive conditions. The reflections in
Section 2 suggested that entrepreneurial qualitites are
both relevant as screening devices by banks and for the
degree of innovation in the choice of projects and financial
sources. Inasmuch as an entrepreneur has accumulated ex-
perience in a related activity or has undergone training in
technical or commercial fields, he is more likely to be re-
garded as a low risk borrower by banks than otherwise. On
the other hand, such an entrepreneur has less problems inTable 3 : Financing Purchases of Fixed Assets - Discriminant Analysis Results
Group centroids
Group 0 (no. of observations)
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Source: Same as Table 1.- 21 -
drafting a viable project and has to put forth less effort
to file a loan application with a formal financial insti-
tution. Similarly, when an entrepreneur has other business
interests as well, this makes him an "established business-
man" in bankers' eyes. Relatively high discriminatory power
was also found for the binary variable "knowledge of avail-
able assistance" which can be regarded as a proxy for entre-
preneurs' general awareness of the institutional environ-
ment. Variables such as legal status and location of the
establishment as well as formal education and race of the
entrepreneur failed to meet the inclusion criterion of the
stepwise procedure. A possible explanation for formal edu-
cation is the relatively high share of Chinese entrepreneurs
in the sample and their traditional preference for vocational
training in family enterprises.
(b) Working Capital
The results of a separate discriminant analysis of the
financing of working capital are presented in Table 4. Essen-
tially similar conclusions can be drawn as with respect to
the financing of fixed assets. The size and age of estab-
lishments, other business interests of entrepreneurs and
their knowledge of assistance measures have been identified
as variables with discriminating power. The respective co-
efficients have the expected sign and can be interpreted as
above. Additional variables with discriminating power have
not been selected by the stepwise procedure in the case ofTable 4 : External Financing of Working Capital - Discriminant Analysis Results
Group centroids
Group 0 (no. of observations)
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Source: Same as Table 1.- 23 -
investment finance are legal status, location, race, and
formal education. A possible explanation for legal status
is that working capital requirements have to be met rela-
tively fast and respective funds should be readily available.
Individual ownerships and partnerships may have more direct
access to convenient and flexible credit from relatives and
friends compared to companies. The negative coefficient of
the location dummy may be explained in a similar way. While
problems of financing fixed assets occur only once in a
while, it would not be worthwhile for rural establishments
to contact urban financial institutions each time external
working capital finance is required. In contrast to the
results for investment finance, experience and professional
qualification of the entrepreneur have not been found to be
relevant for obtaining formal working capital credit. Appli-
cation procedures may be less demanding on the one hand and
banks may be screening less intensively because of the lower
risks involved, on the other. The positive coefficient for
race may simply reflect the fact that the extended family
system as a source of working capital credit is much more
developed in the Chinese community than among Malays. Finally,
the capital-labor ratio, which has been neglected in the
analysis of investment finance for obvious theoretical rea-
sons, has been found to differ between establishments with
and without formal working capital credit. Lack of collateral
in labor-intensive establishments and a preference of banks
for more modern and capital-intensive establishments may ex-
plain the positive sign of the respective coefficient.- 24 -
4. Concluding Remarks
The results obtained in this paper suggest that an overly
pessimistic view of SSEs
1 potential access to formal credit
is not justified. In as far as a sample survey is able to
show, SSEs can obtain formal credit, although the rate of
participation in such transactions is increasing with the
size of establishments. In this respect, discriminant analysis
revealed that size as such is only of minor importance com-
pared to other characteristics of the establishment and the
entrepreneur. Concerning lending decisions of financial in-
stitutions, the relevance of establishment size is likely
to decrease when screening technology is improving. A neces-
sary precondition for this to occur is, however, that the
credit market is fairly competitive, i.e. that terms of
lending are sufficiently flexible to make lending to SSEs
potentially profitable. In such a situation SSEs can obtain
access to formal finance even when specific assistance pro-
grams are absent. Concerning borrowing decisions of SSEs,
a lack of innovative entrepreneurs as well as a lack of
profitable investment opportunities are restraining effective
demand for formal credit. It is, therefore, unlikely that
credit programs alone can be very helpful in realizing the
development potential of SSEs in nontraditional activities.
What is more essential for policy makers to do, is to create
an economic environment where private initiative and ingenuity
are adequately rewarded.- 25 -
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